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Study Background
• Since 1961, at least 205 satellites (spacecraft, launch vehicle orbital stages, 
or parts thereof) have been involved in breakups, as determined by the U.S. 
Space Surveillance Network (SSN).
• Of these, 58 have been assessed as having been deliberate in nature.
– USSR / Russian Federation: 52
– United States 5
– People’s Republic of China 1
• The objective of this study was to determine the nature, frequency, and 
long-term environmental effects of these deliberate satellite breakups.
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Malfunctioning Recoverable Spacecraft
• Soviet/Russian low altitude Earth observation 
spacecraft were designed to carry an explosive 
charge to destroy the recovery vehicle in the event of 
a malfunction which might lead to a landing outside 
of the intended region.
• 1964-1993:  14 spacecraft exploded
• Maximum cataloged debris for one event:  248
Maximum tracked debris for one event:  846
Debris remaining in orbit 1 June 2010:  0
• Most breakups occurred below 300 km; highest 
breakup altitude was 390 km.  Many debris reentered 
immediately, and the remaining debris normally 
reentered within a few weeks, hindering the debris 
cataloging process. 
Zenit 2
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Manned Spacecraft Precursor
• Cosmos 57 was an engineering test vehicle for 
the Voskhod 2 manned mission with the first 
planned space walk.  A ground signals error led 
to loss of control of the spacecraft, which was 
then destroyed by explosive charge to prevent 
errant landing of the command capsule.
• 1965:  1 spacecraft exploded
• Maximum cataloged debris:  167
Debris remaining in orbit 1 June 2010:  0
• The breakup event occurred at an altitude of 380 
km, preventing the cataloging of all large debris.  
All cataloged debris reentered within six weeks.
Cosmos 57
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Orbital Stage Engineering Test
• The unmanned Apollo-Saturn 203 mission was an 
early test of the Saturn IB launch vehicle and, in 
particular, of the Saturn IVB upper stage which 
would be used on the Saturn V launch vehicle for 
Apollo manned lunar missions.  Following 
successful orbital insertion and testing, the 
propellant tanks were intentionally over-
pressurized to failure to verify design margins.
• 1966:  1 orbital stage fragmented
• Maximum cataloged debris:  35
Debris remaining in orbit 1 June 2010:  0
• The breakup event occurred at an altitude of 205 
km, preventing the cataloging of all large debris.  
All cataloged debris reentered within three weeks.
Saturn IVB Stage
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Fractional Orbit Bombardment System (FOBS)
• The Soviet FOBS was designed to place a nuclear 
warhead into a low Earth orbit and to then execute a 
controlled reentry and impact on an enemy location 
before completing an entire revolution about the 
Earth.  The first two tests of FOBS (without nuclear 
payloads) failed when the warheads were placed into 
higher than planned initial orbits.  Both payloads 
were destroyed by on-board explosives.
• 1966:  2 payloads exploded
• Maximum cataloged debris for one event:  52
Debris remaining in orbit 1 June 2010:  0
• The breakup events occurred at an altitude of 300 km 
or less, preventing the cataloging of all large debris.  
All but one cataloged debris reentered within six 
months.
FOBS Payload 
and Final Stage
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Soviet Co-Orbital Antisatellite Tests
• A total of 20 tests of a Soviet co-orbital ASAT 
system were conducted from 1968 to 1982.  In each 
test the weapon was discharged, fragmenting the 
interceptor.  Only nine interceptors produced orbital 
debris; in the other 11 cases all debris were sub-
orbital.  During one test, four debris were released 
by the target satellite.
• 1968-1980:  9 interceptors and 1 target fragmented
• Maximum cataloged debris for one event:  139
Total cataloged debris for all events:  736 
Debris remaining in orbit 1 June 2010:  296
• During the second phase of testing (1976-1982), 
only three orbital debris clouds were created out of 
13 tests, and in each case the intercept was a 
failure.
Co-Orbital ASAT
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Soviet Early Warning Satellites
• Deployment of Soviet operational Oko satellites, 
designed to detect the launch of enemy ballistic 
missiles, began in 1976.   Spacecraft launched before 
1984 were equipped with explosive charges on their 
sensor focal planes.  In the event of unplanned loss 
of spacecraft control, the charges were programmed 
to detonate.  In all, at least 17 Oko satellites 
fragmented.
• 1976-1986:  17 known fragmentations
• Maximum cataloged debris for one event:  25
Total cataloged debris for all events:  167
Debris remaining in orbit 1 June 2010:  151
• The nature of Oko highly elliptical orbits (initially 600 
km by 40,000 km) hindered the detection and 
cataloging of debris.
Oko
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Designed End-of-Mission Breakup
• Russian Orlets-1 low-altitude Earth observation 
satellites were designed for intentional fragmentation 
over the Russian Federation at end-of-mission.  
• 1989-2006:  8 spacecraft fragmented
• Maximum cataloged debris for one event:  31
Maximum tracked debris for one event:  179
Debris remaining in orbit 1 June 2010:  0
• The breakup events occurred at an altitude of 270 km 
or less, preventing the cataloging of all large debris.  
All cataloged debris reentered within five weeks.
Notional Orlets-1
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U.S. Antisatellite Test
• The U.S. has conducted only one test of a proposed 
ASAT system which resulted in the creation of an 
orbital debris cloud.  The Solwind (aka P-78) 
spacecraft was struck by an air-launched weapon at 
an altitude of ~525 km.
• 1985:  1 spacecraft struck by sub-orbital device
• Maximum cataloged debris:  285
Debris remaining in orbit 1 June 2010:  0
• Although 95% of orbital debris reentered within six 
years, this event led to new Department of Defense, 
NASA, and U.S. government restrictions on the 
deliberate creation of orbital debris.  The ASAT 
program which was the subject of this test was 
terminated and the system was never deployed.
Solwind (aka P-78)
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U.S. Technology Test
• Under the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative program, a 
one-of-a-kind test was conducted to determine the 
ability of a sensor to detect, to track, and to close-in 
on a thrusting space vehicle.
• 1986:  Hypervelocity collision of a payload and its 
launch vehicle orbital stage
• Maximum cataloged debris:  18
Maximum tracked debris:  381
Debris remaining in orbit 1 June 2010:  0
• The breakup occurred at an altitude of 220 km, 
preventing the cataloging of all large debris.  All 
cataloged debris reentered within seven months.
USA-19 and the upper 
portion of its Delta 2 
second stage
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Negation of Reentry Risk Hazard
• Following a complete loss of control shortly after 
its launch, USA-193 posed a threat to people on 
Earth from a large quantity of hydrazine which was 
expected to survive reentry.  A sea-based missile 
negated the threat by destroying the spacecraft 
shortly before its anticipated reentry.
• 2008: 1 spacecraft struck by sub-orbital device
• Maximum cataloged debris: 175
Maximum tracked debris:  >1600
Debris remaining in orbit 1 June 2010:  0
• The breakup occurred at an altitude of 250 km, 
preventing the cataloging of all large debris.  95% 
of cataloged debris reentered within three months.
Destruction of 
USA-193
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Chinese Antisatellite Test
• The Fengyun-1C weather satellite was destroyed in the testing of a ground-
based ASAT system.
• 2007: 1 spacecraft struck by sub-orbital device
• Maximum cataloged debris: 2841
Maximum tracked debris:  >3200
Cataloged debris remaining in orbit 1 June 2010:  2754
• The high altitude (860 km) of the breakup created large quantities of long-
lived debris.
Fengyun-1C
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Summary of Deliberate Satellite Breakups
   -  Malfunction of Recoverable Vehicle 15 1045 0
   -  FOBS 2 93 0
   -  Co-Orbital ASAT 9 736 296
   -  Early Warning Satellites 17 167 151
   -  Designed End-of-Mission 8 81 0
Russian Federation
   -  Engineering Test 1 35 0
   -  Air-launched ASAT 1 285 0
   -  Technology Test 1 18 0
   -  Reentry Risk Mitigation 1 175 0
United States
   -  Ground-launched ASAT 1 2841 2754
China
Number of Events
Total Number of 
Cataloged Debris
Number of Cataloged 
Debris in orbit on 
1 June 2010
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Frequency of Deliberate Satellite Breakups
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Debris remains from only one 
event during the past 26 years
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Study Findings
• Of the 58 deliberate satellite fragmentations identified to date, debris remain 
in orbit from only 24 events.
– Only debris from Chinese and Russian ASAT tests and from Russian early warning 
satellites remain in orbit.
• With the exception of debris from Fengyun-1C, the debris from all the other 
deliberate fragmentations amount to less than 3% of all cataloged space 
objects now in Earth orbit.
– Fengyun-1C debris account for 18% of all cataloged space objects now in orbit.
• Since the vast majority of deliberate satellite fragmentation events occurred 
at very low altitudes, in most cases the total number of large debris (> 10 
cm) cataloged was significantly less than the number actually created.
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NASA Provision for Intentional Breakups
• NASA Standard 8719.14 permits the intentional breakup of a space vehicle 
under special conditions, if necessary.
4.4.2.2.1 Requirement 4.4-3.  Limiting the long-term risk to other space systems from 
planned breakups: Planned explosions or intentional collisions shall:
a) Be conducted at an altitude such that for orbital debris fragments larger than 10 cm the 
object-time product does not exceed 100 object-years (Requirement 56453).  For example, 
if the debris fragments greater than 10 cm decay in the maximum allowed 1 year, a 
maximum of 100 such fragments can be generated by the breakup.
b) Not generate debris larger than 1 mm that shall remain in Earth orbit longer than one 
year (Requirement 56454).
4.4.2.2.2 Requirement 4.4-4:  Limiting the short-term risk to other space systems from 
planned breakups: Immediately before a planned explosion or intentional collision, the 
probability of debris, orbital or ballistic, larger than 1 mm colliding with any operating 
spacecraft within 24 hours of the breakup shall be verified to not exceed 10-6 (Requirement 
56455).
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IADC Guideline for Intentional Satellite Destructions
Support to the IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, 2004
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UN Guideline for Intentional Satellite 
Destructions
“Guideline 4:  Avoid intentional destruction and other harmful activities
Recognizing that an increased risk of collision could pose a threat to space 
operations, the intentional destruction of any on-orbit spacecraft and launch 
vehicle orbital stages or other harmful activities that generate long-lived 
debris should be avoided.  When intentional break-ups are necessary, they 
should be conducted at sufficiently low altitudes to limit the orbital lifetime of 
resulting fragments.”
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the United Nations 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 2007
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Concluding Remarks
• NASA, IADC, and UN orbital debris mitigation guidelines strongly restrict or 
discourage the intentional fragmentation of a satellite in Earth orbit.
– Fengyun-1C was not compliant with any of these recommendations.
– Fengyun-1C is only deliberate fragmentation in past 26 years with debris still in orbit.
• If necessary, a deliberate satellite fragmentation should occur at a low 
altitude to limit the orbital lifetimes of all debris (large and small).
– Large debris can normally serve as a proxy for the entire debris ensemble; smaller 
debris can be injected into higher orbits, but they decay more rapidly due to on average 
higher area-to-mass ratios.
• NASA orbital debris mitigation requirements limit the longevity of all orbital 
debris greater than 1 mm to one year.
– This constraint greatly limits significant increases in spatial density (i.e., risk to 
operational space systems) to very short periods, i.e., typically a few weeks.
